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A large international literature has documented the labor market distortions associated with social
security benefits for near-retirees. In this paper, we investigate the ‘other side’ of social security programs,
seeking to document improvements in wellbeing arising from the provision of public pensions. To
the extent households adjust their savings and employment behavior to account for enhanced retirement
benefits, the positive impact of the benefits may be crowded out. We proceed by using the large variation
across birth cohorts in income security entitlements in Canada that arise from reforms to the programs
over the past 35 years.   This variation allows us to explore the effects of benefits on elderly well-being
while controlling for other factors that affect well-being over time and by age. We examine measures
of income, consumption, poverty, and happiness. For income, we find large increases in income corresponding
to retirement benefit increases, suggesting little crowd out. Consumption also shows increases, although
smaller in magnitude than for income.  We find larger retirement benefits diminish income poverty
rates, but have no discernable impact on consumption poverty measures. This could indicate smoothing
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 Expenditures on income security programs for seniors in Canada are projected to 
increase substantially over the next decades.  For example, expenditures on the primary transfer 
programs for seniors, which totaled over $23 billion in 1999/2000, are projected to rise from $25 
billion in 2001 to $109 billion by 2030, or from 2.3 percent of GDP to 3.2 percent (Office of the 
Superintendent of Financial Institutions 2002a).  Benefit expenditures in the largest of the two 
public pension plans, which totaled over $20 billion in 2000/01 are projected to rise to $74 
billion in 2025 (Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions 2002b). 
While these expenditures are growing, Canada is in a better position than other developed 
countries.  The main earnings related pensions have moved in the direction of pre-funding and 
current contribution rates are projected to be actuarially stable in the future.
1  The pure pay-as-
you-go component of the system funded out of general tax revenue is relatively small.  Finally, 
population growth, while diminished relative to earlier decades, is still projected to be larger than 
in Europe or Japan.
2  Still, as the country’s population ages, stresses on the public finances may 
extend to seniors’ pension benefits. 
  There are a variety of solutions possible to this long-term problem.  Some of them 
involve reducing, in one way or another, the benefits available to retirees in Canada.  For 
example, the government could cut the OAS amount, change the translation of past earnings into 
CPP/QPP benefits, or raise program entitlement ages.  As discussed in Baker, Gruber and 
Milligan (2003, 2004), these changes could have significant impacts on both retirement behavior 
and program finances.  For example, we find that raising the age of eligibility for retirement 
                                                 
1 See Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (2002b). 
2 United Nations (2005).  
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programs in Canada would lower program expenditures by over 22%. 
  While improving program finances, such a change might also have pernicious effects on 
the well-being of the elderly in Canada.  The income from retirement programs made up 45.5% 
of the average elderly family’s gross income in Canada in 2000.  If benefits from these programs 
are reduced, it could lead to significant reductions in the standard of living of elderly families. 
  But would it?  This depends on the reaction of other sources of support to the elderly.  
For example, a large literature has investigated the question of whether social security benefits 
simply serve to crowd out savings by the elderly.  Other sources of income support for the 
elderly include their own labor supply or transfers from other family members.  If these other 
sources of support are increased as Social Security benefits are reduced, then there may be little 
implications of benefits reductions for elderly well-being. 
  In this paper, we investigate directly the “other side” of Income Security reform: the 
implications for elderly well-being.  We do so by using the large variation across birth cohorts in 
income security entitlements in Canada that arise from reforms to the program over the past 35 
years.   This variation allows us to explore the effects of benefits on elderly well-being while 
controlling for other factors that affect well-being over time and by age. 
  The paper proceeds as follows.  In Section I, we provide a brief background on the 
institutional features of the income security programs for Canadian elders.  In section II, we 
describe our data sources.  Section III discusses our empirical strategy for using variation in 
benefits across birth cohorts to identify the effect of benefits on well-being.  Section IV presents 
time series evidence on the role of Income Security, and Section V presents regression evidence.  
Section VI concludes with the implications of our findings for Income Security policy.  
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Section I: Background on the Canadian Income Security 
System 
 
Public pension plans for seniors in Canada fall into two groups: 1) the Old Age Security 
program, and 2) the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans.  The Old Age Security program, which 
encompasses the Old Age Security (OAS) pension, the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS), 
and the Allowance, are transfer programs financed out of general tax revenues.  The Canada and 
Quebec Pension Plans (CPP/QPP) are contributory programs that pay a benefit which is 
proportional to an individual’s earnings over his/her working life. 
The Current Parameters 
 
  OAS is the older of the two programs, dating back to 1952.  Its current rules, which have 
been relatively stable since the 1970s, provide for a pension payable to all individuals aged 65 or 
older who satisfy a residency requirement.
3  In December 2005 the monthly benefit paid to 
individuals who fully satisfied the residency requirement was $479.83.   This benefit is clawed 
back from higher income pensioners at a 15 percent rate, starting at incomes of $60,806 (2005).  
Benefits are full indexed to the CPI and fully taxable under the Income Tax Act. 
Available since 1967, the GIS component of OAS is an income tested supplement that is 
also payable to those aged 65 or older.  The income test is applied annually based on taxable 
                                                 
3 Individuals must have been a Canadian citizen or legal resident of Canada at some point before application, and 
have resided in Canada for at least 10 years (if currently in Canada) or 20 years (if currently outside Canada).  The 
benefit is prorated for pensioners with less than 40 years of Canadian residence, unless they are “grandfathered” 
under rules that apply to the persons who were over age 25 and had established attachment to Canada prior to July 
1977.  
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income (as defined by the Income Tax Act, excluding any OAS pension) at the family level.  
Benefits are taxed back at a 50 percent rate, expect in families where only one partner is 65 or 
older, in which case the tax rate is 25 percent.  There are separate monthly benefits for married 
and single individuals, fully indexed to the CPI, which amounted to $371.46 and $570.27, 
respectively, in December 2005.  These benefits are not subject to income taxes. 
Finally, the Allowance (formerly the Spouse’s Allowance) is an income tested benefit 
payable to 60-64 year old partners of individuals who are aged 65 or older.  It is also available to 
widow/widowers who are aged 60-64.  This part of OAS was introduced in 1975.  For the 
partners of 65+ year olds the benefit equals the sum of an OAS pension plus a GIS at the married 
rate.  Benefits are reduced by 75 cents for each dollar of income to the OAS part of the benefit is 
eliminated.  At this point the benefit (as well as the partner’s GIS) is reduced according to 
standard GIS rules.  Widow/widowers receive a slightly higher benefit the benefit, but the 
income test is applied equivalently.  Again benefits are fully indexed and not subject to income 
taxes.
4   
CPP and QPP pensions, available since 1966, are financed by employer and employee 
contributions.  In 2005, these are (each) payable at a rate of 4.95 percent on earnings between 
$3,500 and $ 41,100.00 (the Year’s Maximum Pensionable Earnings, YMPE).  Pensions are 
available to individuals aged 60 or older who have made contributions in at least one calendar 
year in the (“contributory”) period stretching from age 18 to the year of application (or age 70).
5  
Benefits are actuarially adjusted for applications at different ages in the interval 60 through 70.  
                                                 
4 More details on the Allowance are available in Baker (2002). 
5 For individuals who were 18 prior to 1966, the contributory period starts on January 1, 1966.  
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The adjustment is a reduction (premium) of 0.5 percent for each month the application precedes 
(follows) the 65
th birthday.  Also, applications prior to age 65 are subject to a retirement test, 
which is that the individual’s annual rate of earnings cannot exceed the maximum retirement 
pension payable at age 65, for the year in which the pension is claimed.
6  
The amount of benefits received is based on the individual’s “average” earnings over the 
contributory period.  Any months (a) receiving a disability pension, (b) spent rearing small 
children,
7 (c) between age 65 and the commencement of the pension
8, and (d) 15 percent of the 
remaining months, are excluded from the calculation.
9  In each of the remaining months, 
earnings are expressed as a fraction of 1/12 of the current YMPE, to a maximum of one.
10  The 
average of these fractions is then multiplied by the average value of the YMPE over the previous 
five years (including the year of application), and then by 0.25, to arrive at the benefit level.  
Benefits are fully indexed and subject to income taxes. 
Both the CPP and QPP pay survivor pensions when a contributor dies and has made 
contributions for the lesser of 10 years or one third of the number of years in the contributory 
period.
11  For survivors under age 65, benefits are equal to a flat rate benefit plus 37.5 percent of 
the earnings-related pension of the deceased spouse. Benefits are reduced if the claimant is 
younger than age 45 and is not disabled and has no dependents.  For survivors aged 65 and 
                                                 
6 There are no restrictions on returning to work after the benefit is being paid. 
7 This is defined as months where there was a child less than 7 years of age and the worker had zero or below 
average annual earnings. 
8 Periods after age 65 to age 70 can be substituted for periods prior to age 65 if this will increase their future 
retirement pension. 
9 The last three of these exclusions cannot be used, however, to reduce the contributory period below 120 months 
after taking into account the offset for months of disability pension receipt. 
10 Excess earnings in one month above 1/12 of the YMPE may be applied to months in the same calendar year in 
which earnings are below 1/12 of the YMPE.  
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above, the pension is equal to the greater of a) 37.5 percent of the deceased’s retirement pension 
plus 100 percent of the survivor’s own retirement pension, or b) 60 percent of the retirement 
pension of the deceased plus 60 percent of the survivor’s own retirement pension.  There is an 
upper cap on total payments equal to the maximum retirement pension payable in that year.
12  
There are also orphan benefits payable to the children of the deceased.
13 
The CPP and QPP also pay disability pensions.  The benefit is equal to a flat-rate portion 
plus an earnings-related portion equal to 75 percent of the applicable CPP/QPP retirement 
pension, calculated with the contributory period ending at the date of disability.  More 
information can be found in Gruber (2000). 
Program Changes over Time 
 
Changes to the OAS and CPP/QPP programs over time are the basis of identifying any 
impact of income security benefits on well being.  These changes have altered both the level of 
benefits available to claimants, as well as the eligibility criteria. 
The age of eligibility for OAS pensions was changed over the period 1965 to 1970.  
Initially these pensions were available starting at age 70 but starting in 1965 the age was lowered 
annually in one year increments until it reached 65 in 1970. Full indexation of benefits did not 
start until 1973.  Previously, adjustments to benefits were ad hoc.  Finally, the residency 
requirements for benefits were changed in 1977.  Originally individuals who did not fully satisfy 
the requirement received no benefit, but starting in 1977 pro-rated benefits were granted for 
                                                                                                                                                             
11 There is also a lump sum death benefit, which is generally equal to one-half of the annual CPP/QPP pension 
amount up to a maximum $2,500.  
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partial fulfillment.   
The GIS was introduced in 1967.  Benefits were indexed starting in 1973.  There were 
also one time real increases in benefits of 69 percent in 1971, 20 in 1972, 44 percent in 1979/80 
and 16 percent in 1984. The introduction of the program, as well as these benefit changes, should 
have heterogeneous impacts across birth cohorts.  For example, older cohorts who missed out on 
CPP/QPP pensions (introduced in 1966) are more reliant on GIS than younger cohorts whose 
GIS is partially taxed back because of these pensions.   Also, the introduction of the Allowance 
in 1975 led to a dramatic temporal change in the public support available to 60-64 year olds.  
This support was extended to widows aged 60-64 in 1985. 
The introduction of the CPP/QPP in 1966 had a differential impact across birth cohorts.  
The parameters of the system were phased in over a ten year “transition” period. First, pensions 
were initially (as of January 1967) payable starting at age 68.  The minimum age was lowered in 
subsequent years until it settled at age 65 in 1970.  Second, pensions were prorated.  The benefit 
was calculated as the standard pension entitlement multiplied by the faction of the transition 
period that the individual had made contributions to the plans.  For example, if the benefit 
application was made in January 1972 after 6 years of contributions, the standard pension 
entitlement would be multiplied by 0.6, which is just the number of months of contributions (72) 
divided by 120 months, the length of the transition period. This means that those born before 
1900 got no pensions, those born between 1901 and 1910 got partial benefits, and those born 
in/after 1911 were 65 in 1976 and so they got full benefits.  The details of the phase-in were 
                                                                                                                                                             
12 If the surviving spouse is receiving his or her own CPP disability pension, the sum of the earnings-related portion 
of the two pensions cannot exceed the maximum retirement pension available in the year. 
13 More details on survivor pensions are available in Baker et al. (2004).  
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announced in 1965, so the 1901 cohort got a windfall, while later cohorts could have anticipated 
the benefits they would receive. 
Starting in 1970, CPP/QPP benefits were available starting at age 65.  This changed in 
1984 for the QPP and 1987 for the CPP when more flexible rules were introduced.  As described 
above, these rules allowed application anytime between ages 60 and 70 subject to an actuarial 
adjustment. 
The real value of pensions payable by the CPP/QPP changed quite dramatically over the 
period 1975 and 1986.  The YMPE, which is a prime determinant of benefits, was initially set to 
equal average earnings.  However, it was not indexed, so by the mid 1970s the value of the 
YMPE had fallen to around 70% of average earnings.  To rectify this situation, both the CPP and 
QPP started to increase the YMPE by 12.5% per year, stopping in 1986 when the YMPE again 
reached average earnings.  This accounts for the large increases in the CPP/QPP benefits over the 
decade from the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s. 
Finally, both the CPP and QPP initially had earnings tests on the pensions of 
beneficiaries aged 65 to 69.  Benefits were recovered at a rate of 50 cents for every dollar of 
earnings in excess of 18 percent of the YMPE on an annual basis.  An additional 50 cents was 
recovered for earnings in excess of 30 percent of the YMPE.  Therefore, at higher levels the tax 
back was 100%.  The earnings test was eliminated from the CPP in 1975.  The second tier of the 
test was eliminated from the QPP in 1973, while the remaining tier was dropped in 1977. 
In Figure 1 we graph the real value of the different pensions and benefits starting in 1961. 
Many of the reforms and changes reviewed can be clearly seen in this picture.  In particular, the 
real increases in the GIS in 1971/72, 1978/79 and 1984, the indexing of the OAS pension, the  
9 
effects of the CPP transition period and the recovery of the YMPE to the level of average wages 
from 1975 to 1986. 
 
 
Section II: Data Sources 
 
Our analysis encompasses three aspects of elderly wellbeing:  incomes, consumption, and 
happiness.  In all cases, we use survey microdata provided by Statistics Canada.  Below, we 
describe the details for each of our data sources in detail.  In addition, we explain exactly how we 
form the wellbeing variables we use in the analysis from the raw data sources.  Table 1 provides 
descriptions of our data sources and the variables we form. 
  There are several issues common to all of the data sets that we use.  First, we use 2002 
Euros for all of the analysis.  We update dollar values to 2002 using the Canadian Consumer 
Price Index, then translate to Euros using the average 2002 Euro-Canadian dollar exchange rate 
(1.4832).  Second, we scale all income and consumption data by an equivalence scale to account 
for the size of the household / family.  The first adult is counted as one, each subsequent adult 
counts as 0.7, and each child under age 18 counts as 0.5.  A third issue is the definition and 
weighting of elderly households.  We define an elderly household as one in which there is at 
least one member age 60 or over.  All other households are therefore classified as non-elderly.  
Furthermore, we weight the results for the elderly households by how many members are ages 60 




We draw our income data from two different sources.  From 1971 to 1997, we have data 
from the Survey of Consumer Finances.  This survey reports information on the education, age, 
family structure, labour market activity, and incomes of respondents.  In particular for income, 
the data is disaggregated to a degree that serves our purposes well.  In particular, we use the 
variables for after-tax income, Canada / Quebec Pension Plan income, and OAS/GIS/SPA 
income to measure the actual public pension benefits received by elderly Canadians. 
The Survey of Consumer Finances is conducted using the sampling frame of the monthly 
Labour Force Survey, which is a stratified random sample of Canadians with some oversampling 
of smaller provinces to ensure sufficient sample size.  With the survey weights, nationally 
representative results can be obtained.
14  The survey is available in odd years from 1971 to 1981, 
then 1982, and finally on an annual basis from 1984 to 1997.  The survey is available for 
different family definitions and for individuals.  We use the census family sample, which ranges 
in size from 25,927 up to 47,840.
15  Unfortunately, the household version of the survey does not 
contain disaggregated government pension income, so we must use the family version. 
The Survey of Consumer Finances was replaced in the late 1990s by the Survey of 
Labour and Income Dynamics.  The new survey is available for 1993 to 2002 and for our 
purposes is similar to the previous survey. One interesting difference is the source for income 
                                                 
14 The sampling frame excluded residents of the three northern territories, those living in institutions, and inhabitants 
of native reserves.  These groups typically account for less than three percent of the population. 
15 A census family is comprised of parent(s) with their children, childless couples, or grandparents living with their 
grandchildren.  Individuals on their own who are not in a census family are classified as “non-family individuals”, 
but are included in the census family sample. 
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data.  For the Survey of Consumer Finances, income data was asked on a recall basis.  For the 
Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, however, respondents may check a box indicating 
consent to attach data directly from tax records.  A high percentage of respondents take this 
option (over 80 percent in 2000).  We append the 1998 to 2002 data from the Survey of Labour 
and Income Dynamics to the Survey of Consumer finance data for 1971 to 1997 to complete our 
income data. 
We form several income variables for our analysis.  The first is total income from public 
pensions, which is the sum of reported CPP/QPP and OAS-GIS-SPA income. Second, we take 
the reported total after-tax income for the family.  We use the mean, along with several 
percentiles of this variable.  We also use the mean calculated just for those who are beneath the 
poverty line. Third, we form a measure of relative income poverty.  For each year, we find the 
median family income for non-elderly families.  We set a poverty line at 40 percent of this 
median, then form a dummy variable for each elderly family indicating whether it is over or 
under the poverty line.  Fourth, we measure absolute poverty by repeating the same exercise but 
using the poverty line for 1971 in all years.  Combined, these four measures will richly describe 
the income patterns of elderly Canadian families over the three decades we study. 
Consumption data 
The consumption data we use come from two different surveys, each conducted over a 
number of years.  The first survey is the Family Expenditure Survey.  It was first conducted in 
1969, followed irregularly by surveys in 1974, 1978, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1990, 1992, and 1996.  
The sampling frame in several of the years included only residents of large cities, so we restrict 
our sample in all years to residents of large cities to maintain comparability.  This survey is also  
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based on the Labour Force Survey sampling frame, so survey weights can potentially produce 
nationally representative results.  The sample size varies considerably, with between 4,569 and 
15,140 observations. 
The unit of observation changed for the Family Expenditure survey in 1990.  Prior to 
1990, the concept used was the spending unit, defined as “a group of people living in the same 
dwelling who depend on a common or pooled income for major expenses or one financially 
independent individual living alone.”  This is similar to a definition of an economic family, one 
or more of which can live in any one dwelling.  From 1990 on, the unit of observation was the 
household, defined simply as those in the same dwelling unit.  
The second set of consumption data is the annual Survey of Household Spending, 
available for the years 1997 through 2002.  This survey has larger sample sizes than the Family 
Expenditure Surveys did, with around 14 and 18 thousand households per year.  We discard the 
2002 survey because single years of age are not reported in the public-use version of the data. 
The key variable we extract from these surveys is the current consumption of the 
household.  Included in this measure is spending on goods and services throughout the year.  It is 
equivalent to the total expenditure of the household less personal taxes, gifts and donations, and 
life insurance.  We use the mean, as well as several percentiles of this variable.  In addition to the 
current consumption variable, we construct two other measures of elderly wellbeing similar to 
those we made for income.  There is a relative consumption poverty measure constructed as 
being under 40 percent of the median non-elderly household’s consumption level in each year, 




To undertake our analysis of the happiness of elderly Canadian households, we put 
together several waves of the General Social Survey.  The sample is formed using a random digit 
dialing methodology, with supplemental samples drawn from the Labour Force Survey sampling 
frame in some years.  Sample sizes are around ten thousand observations per year.  The 
happiness question that we require is asked in the years 1985, 1986, 1989-1991, 1996, and 1998.  
Unfortunately, age is only reported in 5-year ranges, so we cannot identify the exact year of age 
of the respondents.  As the happiness question is individually based, we use the individual as the 
unit of observation for the happiness data. 
The exact wording of the question is “presently, would you describe yourself as . . .”  
Possible responses are very happy, somewhat happy, somewhat unhappy, and very unhappy.   
We form two variables to use for our analysis.  First is an indicator for having responded “very 
happy.”  The second is an indicator for having responded either somewhat or very unhappy.   
 
Section III: Empirical Strategy 
 
  For the regression analysis that forms the core of this paper, we want to regress well-
being outcomes on retirement income.  Because observed retirement income may be determined 
by the same factors that determine the outcomes we wish to study, we create simulated benefits 
that are exogenous to the outcomes.  We do this by attempting to capture legislative variation in 
the system over time.  In general, benefits are formed from two components: laws and the  
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characteristics of recipients.  The laws come in two forms:  the euro amount of the benefits and 
the age at which benefits are available.  The idea of the simulated benefit approach is to abstract 
from all differences in characteristics of recipients and focus solely on variation in benefits that 
arises from law changes.  Ideally, we would take exactly the same person, put him in every birth 
cohort, and then compute his benefits.  In this way, we would hold characteristics constant, and 
any benefits variation that we saw over time or across birth cohorts would be due to law changes. 
Of course, this is impossible in reality. Two types of factors may differ across birth 
cohorts that can affect benefit determination.  The first type includes factors which are unlikely 
to be endogenous to Income Security rules (at least to a first approximation), but which are 
potentially important omitted determinants of well-being: differences in earnings histories; 
differences in capital income (which can matter for GIS eligibility and benefits); and differences 
in spousal labor supply.  The second type is factors which are likely endogenous to Income 
Security rules, such as differences in actual observed retirement ages.  One possible simulated 
benefits approach would hold the first type constant, and compute benefits for each birth cohort 
based on that constant comparison.  A more difficult question is whether one wants to hold the 
second set of factors constant, as this may be part of the effect that we want to capture in our 
results. 
Thus, we consider three approaches. First, we show results using actual benefits received, 
as measured by reported IS income at each age.  Second, we employ a “partial simulation” 
approach, in which the first set of factors (earnings, capital income, family status) is held 
constant, but the second set of factors (retirement ages) is allowed to vary.  In particular, we base 
the benefit amount on a fixed earnings history across all birth cohorts, not the actual earnings  
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history by cohort.  The motivation for this partial simulation approach is to take account of 
changes in retirement behaviour that may be responses to changes in program structure.  At the 
same time, by using the fixed earnings history the mixed approach allows for the fact that there 
could be correlated changes over time in tastes for leisure (as manifested in early retirement) and 
measures of well-being that could bias the results if each cohort’s actual earnings were used.  
Finally, we also consider a “full simulation” approach, whereby both the first and second sets of 
factors are held constant.  For that approach, we use the base cohort earnings history and the 
base cohort retirement patterns.  So, in the full simulation, the variation comes only from 
legislative variation since earnings and retirement variation are held constant for the entire 
sample. 
Our empirical approach exploits the available policy variation.  We concentrate on age-
year cells.  By calculating the expected benefits for a typical person in each age-year 
combination, we can exploit changes that occur through time (like the GIS and CPP changes) 
that affect people of different age groups differently.  For example, the GIS expansions affected 
those ages 65 and older, but not those who were younger.  The focus on age-year cells, therefore, 
provides both a clear and an effective source of identification. 
Methodology 
 
In order to impute benefits to a retired family we must know their earnings history, their 
capital and private pension income, at what age they retired, their marital status, and the rules 
that were in place that determined their benefits.  Combined, this information allows us to 
calculate ‘typical’ benefits for families in our data. Our empirical strategy involves holding  
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several factors constant across all of the cohorts in our sample.  We do this by focusing on the 
1920 birth cohort, which reaches age 65 in the middle year of our sample (1985).  By pushing 
this cohort through the benefit calculation for all years in the sample, we will be able to extract 
only the variation derived from changes in policy rules, since the cohort characteristics will be 
identical by construction. 
For the age-year analysis, we form the earnings profile by taking deciles of earnings in 
each year and age in the Survey of Consumer Finance data over all individuals, separately for 
men and women.  We perform this calculation only for the 1920 birth cohort, which we will use 
to simulate benefits for all cohorts.  We then average these deciles to form an earnings value for 
each age and year.  The motivation for this decile-based approach is to capture non-work in the 
best way possible.  Median earnings of women in earlier years were zero, for example, so using 
the decile approach allows us to capture the fact that at least some of the women in those years 
had earnings.  Since the oldest income microdata available to us is 1971, we impute earnings to 
each year previous to 1971 by deflating the 1971 age-earnings profile by the growth in the 
industrial composite wage.  For calculating CPP/QPP benefits, we need to extend back to 1966.   
For capital income, we use data from the Survey of Consumer Finances.  We define 
capital income as the sum of income from investments and income from retirement pensions, 
which includes both withdrawals from Registered Retirement Savings Plans and Registered 
Retirement Income Funds.  For the age-year analysis, we form deciles of capital income for each 
age and year by sex.  The decile approach allows us to capture nonlinear effects of the income 
security system that would be missed if we simply used the median or mean for assigning capital 
income.  Again, we use only the 1920 cohort’s capital income profile, adjusted up and down for  
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other cohorts using the CPI.  We assign the capital income deciles to the earnings deciles by 
assuming that the lowest earning decile has the lowest capital income, the 2
nd lowest earners with 
the 2
nd lowest capital income, and so on.  At the end of the calculation, we average over the 
deciles to arrive at the simulated benefit. 
We do not observe the age of retirement for elderly Canadians in our data.  Because 
CPP/QPP benefits depend on the date of retirement through the actuarial adjustment of early 
retirement benefits, we must account for the possibility of different retirement dates.  We do so 
by calculating the retirement benefits that would be received at each potential age of retirement 
between the ages 55 and 70.  We then average these benefits using the observed retirement 
probabilities at each age for the cohort as weights.  We form the cohort retirement probabilities 
with the Survey of Consumer Finances data. We assume that none are retired at age 55 and that 
all are retired by age 70.  The retirement rate is the change in the proportion of respondents who 
are employed in one year over the previous year.  Using these observed rates, we form a cohort- 
and sex-specific set of probabilities for retirement that sum to one.  With these probabilities, we 
then determine a retirement age-weighted average of the benefits the family is currently 
receiving. 
Finally, we must consider different family types.  Someone we observe at an older age 
may have previously been married but is now widowed.  For such a person, we must assign 
spousal benefits in order to get a correct measure of total Income Security benefits.  We take 
observed family types by age and sex in the 1990 General Social Survey and develop a set of  
18 
probabilities.
16  For each family in our simulation, we average the benefits over each of the seven 
family types using the 1990 probabilities as weights. 
Our goal is to have simulated benefits for each someone in each age-year cell. To form 
the full and the partially simulated benefits we use for the analysis, we use the described 
methodology in slightly different ways.  For both simulations, we use the 1920 cohort earnings 
profile, the 1990 cross-sectional family types, and the 1920 cohort capital income profile.  For 
the partially simulated benefit, we use each cohort’s observed retirement pattern to find the 
simulated benefits.  In contrast, the fully simulated benefit applies the 1920 cohort’s retirement 
pattern to all cohorts in our data.  So, the key difference between the partially and fully simulated 
benefits is whether cohort-specific or fixed retirement rates were used in the construction of the 
benefits.  
Description of Variation 
 
  The result of this simulation exercise is a benefits measure that varies across birth cohorts 
only for the age-year cells.  In the regression analysis below, we will control for both age and 
year effects, allowing us to identify the impact of income security programs on well-being solely 
from variation across birth cohorts.  In this section, we show that such variation is sizeable, and 
explain its legislative origins. 
  Figure 2 opens our discussion by showing the evolution of IS income over time.  The first 
line in this figure shows the average benefits paid to elders under IS programs, in 2002 Euros per 
person.  The line is derived from aggregate spending on the programs divided by the number of 
                                                 
16 The seven family types we consider are married, male single never married, male widowed, male  
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Canadians age 60 and over.
17  The rise has been substantial, from around 2,000 Euros in the early 
60s up to 3,000 in the 1970s and then 6,000 by the 1990s.  The increase from year 2000 over 
1965 is 263 percent.  The second line shows the ratio of those average benefits to average worker 
income, with the scale on the right-hand side axis.  Over the same 1965 to 2000 period, this ratio 
increased by 179 percent, indicating that benefit growth has far-outpaced earnings growth over 
the last generation.  This gives an indication of the very large extent to which Canada’s programs 
have been expanded. 
  Figure 3 then shows our partially and fully simulated benefits measures, graphed over 
time.  These also grow steadily over time, in parallel fashion to actual benefits income, and move 
very closely together.  While they follow the same trends, our simulated benefits appear slightly 
lower than actual benefits for the time period under consideration. 
  Figure 4 shows the evolution of these benefits measures over birth cohorts more clearly.  
We graph the simulated benefits levels for each cohort in the year they reach age 65.  The first 
upward increment in the late 1960s corresponds to the extension of OAS benefits down to age 
65.  The great rise in the 1970s is caused by the phasing in of the CPP/QPP over 1970 to 1976, 
the introduction and expansion of the GIS in 1967, 1971, 1979, and 1980, and finally the SPA in 
1976.  Through the 1980s and 1990s, benefits grow much more slowly, increasing only with 
higher earnings through the YMPE.  The partially simulated benefits line is more volatile than 
the fully simulated line, reflecting the additional variation introduced by the cohort-specific 
retirement rates. 
                                                                                                                                                             
separated/divorced, female single never married, female widowed, female separated/divorced. 
17 The source is Human Resources Development (1999).  
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The final picture of the variation in Canada’s recent history is in Figure 5.  Here, we 
expand on the age 65 variation from the previous figure to show benefits at several ages.   
Benefits at age 60 are zero until the 1980s when early retirement is introduced in Quebec (in 
1984) and the rest of Canada (in 1987).  Benefits at ages 70, 80, and 90 are similar until the mid 
70s, when those who are 70 begin to show CPP/QPP income.  These same cohorts a decade later 
as 80 year olds begin showing CPP/QPP income in the 1980s, so they pull higher than the 90 
year olds who do not receive any CPP/QPP. 
Regression Framework 
 
Having created these various measures of benefits (actual, partially simulated, fully 
simulated), we can then use them in regression analysis to assess how income security generosity 
affects our various measures of well-being.  We make use both of the partial and the fully 
simulated benefits.  All regressions use age-year cells as the unit of observation. We weight by 
the cell size from the micro-data in order to produce results that correspond to the full survey 
outcomes.   
We begin by looking at ‘first-stage’ analysis of the effects of our simulated benefits on 
the actual benefits.  In the specification, we include the simulated benefit, age dummies, year 
dummies, and a vector of cohort characteristics Xay.  The characteristics are measured for the 
cohort at age 50, and include their average earnings, education, and proportion married.   
 
ay ay y a ay ay e X YEAR AGE enefits SimulatedB fits ActualBene + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0 β β β β β , 
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For some of the results we use the mean of the simulated benefit as the policy variable on the 
right-hand side.  However, for some of the poverty measures, using a more targeted percentile of 
the within-cell distribution is more appropriate.  We make clear what measure of simulated 
benefits is used when we discuss each regression result below. 
  We follow the ‘first-stage’ regressions with results that examine the ‘reduced form’ effect 
of the simulated benefits on the well-being outcomes.  The specification is similar to the first-
stage specification above. 
ay ay y a ay ay e X YEAR AGE enefits SimulatedB Outcomes + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0 β β β β β , 
 
The simulated benefits are either the partial or the fully simulated benefits.  Again, we also use 
different measures of the benefits within-cell for the different outcome measures. 
  Our third and final specification uses a full instrumental variables approach.  We use the 
simulated benefits to predict actual benefits, then use the predicted actual benefits as a regressor 
for the outcome variables.  So, the simulated benefits act as an instrument for the observed actual 
benefits. 
ay ay y a ay ay e X YEAR AGE fits ActualBene Outcomes + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0 β β β β β , 
 
  Section IV: Evidence 
 
Time Series Evidence 
 
We begin our presentation of the effects of IS programs on well-being by examining the 
evolution of our various well-being indicators over time.  We use the equivalence-scale adjusted  
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measures, so the data represent the amount per effective person in 2002 Euros.  In each case, we 
show two lines on each graph.  One line shows the evolution of the outcome in question for the 
elderly in our sample, while the other provides the same measure for the working-age families in 
order to provide a basis for comparison.  We normalize each of these lines to 100 in the first year 
the outcome is available, in order to emphasize the percentage change through time. 
Figure 6 shows the graph for actual benefits received, as reported in our microdata sources.  
Similar to the aggregate and simulated benefits shows in earlier figures, there is a strong increase 
from 1971 through 2000, with a slight flattening out over the last few years.  There is no non-
elderly line in this graph since non-elderly do not receive retirement benefits. 
Figure 7 shows the results for average after-tax family income.  Average incomes rise by 
about 40 percent from 1970 through 1980, and very slowly thereafter, for both the elderly and 
the non-elderly.  Both lines jump for the 1998 to 2002 period. Two factors underlie this break in 
trend.  First, it reflects the change from the Survey of Consumer Finances over to the Survey of 
Labour and Income Dynamics.  The difference is in the average reported size of census families 
across the two data sources – families in the new survey are smaller on average than in the older 
survey, leaving the income to be spread less thinly.  However, there is also a sharp increase in 
incomes noticeable in 1998 when one compares data across the available years of the Survey of 
Labour and Income Dynamics.  So, some of this increase does reflect growing incomes. 
Figures 8 and 9 show the evolution of poverty over this time period, with the relative and 
absolute income poverty measures respectively.  By both measures, there is a steep reduction in 
elderly poverty relative to the non-elderly over the 1970s and 1980s, which is consistent with IS 
program growth.  For relative poverty, however, this reduction does not begin until the late  
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1970s, after the major CPP/QPP expansion has completely phased in and the GIS expansions of 
the late 1970s have been implemented.  We can see clearly the drastic drop in elderly poverty, 
from 100 in 1971 down to under 40 by the early 1980s, for a drop of 60 percent.  For absolute 
poverty, the reduction is very steep from 1971 onwards for the elderly, but it is also steep for the 
non-elderly as well.  Once again, the major improvement for the elderly relative to the non-
elderly is in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  The timing of these movements corresponds well 
with the GIS and CPP expansions. 




th percentiles for the elderly, along with the 50
th percentile for the non-elderly.  
One line is sharply different than the others – the 10
th percentile of elderly income.  It rises to 
around 230 by the 1990s, for an increase of 130% relative to 1971.  In contrast, the other 
measures increase to only 140-160.  Again, this reflects the phasing in of the CPP/QPP along 
with the expansions of the GIS. 
We next turn to our consumption-based measures of well-being.  Here the time series are 
less complete due to more infrequent surveys.  The volatility reflects in part the differences in 
survey coverage and sample size across different waves of the consumption surveys.   
Nonetheless, it is clear from Figure 11 that the time series for the elderly and non-elderly 
consumption largely move together, suggesting relatively little effect of IS programs. 
Figures 12 and 13 examine relative and absolute consumption poverty measures.  In both 
cases, the elderly and non-elderly move closely together until the late 1980s and early 1990s, at 
which point there is a larger fall in elderly consumption poverty than non-elderly consumption 
poverty.  Once again, given the more or less steady rise in IS benefits over this period, it is hard  
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to attribute this to IS effects. 
Figure 14 graphs the percentiles of consumption, as we saw in Figure 10 for income.  
There appears to be little difference in the increase for the 10
th, 50
th, or 90
th percentile of 
consumption for the elderly, as they are all very close to 130 by 2001.  The consumption of the 
non-elderly is slightly higher.  This is in sharp contrast to the income graph in Figure 10 that 
showed a huge increase in income at the 10
th percentile. 
Finally, Figures 15 and 16 show the results for our happiness measures.  There is clearly 
variation across different samples, reflecting either true differences in happiness across time or 
some kind of differences in the sampling methodology.  The measures for the elderly and non-
elderly move very closely, suggesting little effect of the IS expansions on elderly happiness. 
Regression Results 
 
We next move from time series graphical analysis to regression analysis, which allows us 
to exploit the variation in benefits across birth cohorts documented in Figure 5.   As is clear from 
that figure, a major source of variation is the evolution of benefits at age 60 over time, relative to 
other ages.  This allows us to include both age and year dummies in our model, controlling for 
general differences in well-being by age and over time.  Figure 17 shows our measure of 
simulated benefits graphed against income, by age/year cell.  It is clear that the set of points to 
the left, for 60-64 year olds, is described by a different process than is the set of points to the 
right, for 65 and over.  The age 55-59 group is even more concentrated along the axis, as they 
receive no benefits under the simulation.  Given the differences between the 60-64 and the 65+ 
groups, we conclude that including age dummies is the proper specification rather than trying to  
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fit a linear age term across both clouds of data. 
The results of our analysis are presented in Table 2 and Table 3.  In Table 2 for each 
outcome variable we show the mean and the number of observations.  Across the next 6 columns 
are the results for the first-stage, reduced-form and instrumental variables analysis.  Table 2 
presents the results for eleven measures of income. 
The first set of results focuses on the first stage analysis.  Actual income is regressed on 
simulated benefits.  The first result uses the means of simulated benefits to predict the mean IS 
income.  The coefficient of 0.759 indicates that a one euro increase in partially simulated 
benefits leads to a 75.9 cent increase in after-tax income.  For the fully simulated benefits, the 
coefficient is slightly higher, at 0.830.  Both of these are highly statistically significant. 
The next row in Table 2 shows the results for the mean income of those under the poverty 
line.  The simulated benefits used in these regressions are the 10
th percentile of benefits.  The 
results are negative and only marginally statistically significant, suggesting some evidence that 
higher benefits leads to a decrease in income.   A contributing factor to the odd results is the fact 
that elderly poverty is very small after the CPP/QPP became fully phased in and the GIS was 
expanded, as was made clear in Figure 8.  It is likely that most of those in poverty would be 
those who were not eligible for the GIS or the CPP/QPP, such as newer immigrants.  Since we 
can’t control for these factors in the regression, it might be these excluded characteristics that 
drive the result. 
The next three rows show the results for estimates at different points of the income 
distribution.  We have three dependent variables, formed as the mean of IS income between the 
5
th and 15
th percentile, the 45
th and 55
th percentile, and the 85
th to 95
th percentile.  The simulated  
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benefits we use in the three cases are the 10
th, 50
th, and 90
th percentiles. The results indicate that 
the simulated benefits are strong predictors of income at the 10
th and 50
th percentiles, but do 
worse for the 90
th percentile.  Because higher income seniors likely have a larger proportion of 
their incomes coming from non-governmental sources, the lower predictive power of the 
simulated benefits at the 90
th percentile should not be surprising. 
The bottom half of Table 2 presents the reduced form and instrumental variables estimates 
for the well-being outcomes.  The first outcome is mean income.  Using the fully simulated 
benefits, the reduced form specification indicates that a one dollar increase in benefits leads to a 
89 cent increase in mean income.  When we use the simulated benefit as an instrument, the 
predicted impact of a dollar increase in benefits is 1.073. This suggests that benefits do not 
crowd out other sources of income.  In contrast, the partially simulated benefit gives a result of 
0.546, which does suggest some evidence of crowd-out. 
The next two rows show the results for poverty.  We use the simulated benefits of the 10
th 
percentile of lifetime earnings for this estimation, since it is more relevant for the estimation of 
poverty rates.  The results for partially and fully simulated benefits are quite similar.  For relative 
income poverty, an increase in benefits of €1,000 is predicted to decrease poverty by 2.6 
percentage points for the fully simulated IV specification. The absolute poverty measure shows 
no statistically significant effect. 
To gauge the magnitude of the relative poverty coefficient, we can compare the trend in 
poverty over our sample period to the changes in benefits to see what proportion of the change 
can be explained by the benefit changes.  In the age-year cell data, the 1
st decile of benefits 
averaged €1,137 for those 60 and over in 1971, rising to €3,847 in 2002 for an increase of   
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€2,710.  Our estimate of -0.026 implies that poverty should drop by about 7.10 percentage 
points. In the data, actual poverty dropped by 7.38 percentage points over this period, meaning 
that the increase in benefits can explain 96.3% of the trend.  In other words, the decrease in 
poverty over the 1971-2002 period can almost entirely be explained by the increase in the 
generosity of benefits for low-income seniors. 
 
The final three rows show the results at different percentiles of the income distribution.  At 
the 10
th percentile, both the partially and fully simulated benefits reveal little evidence of income 
crowd out, with IV coefficients close to one.  At the 50
th percentile, the partially simulated 
benefit coefficient is 0.330 and the fully simulated benefit is 0.728.  For the 90
th percentile, the 
partially simulated result is not significant, and the fully simulated result comes in at 2.502.  At 
the higher income levels, benefits represent a lower proportion of income which may make the 
results more sensitive. 
In Table 3, we repeat the reduced form and instrumental variable analysis with our 
consumption and happiness measures.  The first row shows the results for mean consumption.  
The IV results are 0.660 for partially simulated and 0.797 for fully simulated benefits.  This 
suggests some crowd out of consumption.  The next two rows look at consumption poverty.  For 
none of the specifications – either for relative or absolute poverty – do we find a significant 
coefficient.   
Taking these results along with the income poverty results together, an obvious question is 
how income poverty can be relieved by the IS system but consumption poverty shows no effect.  
To resolve this puzzle, we turn back to some graphical analysis in Figure 19.  We plot income  
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and consumption poverty rates in 2000 by age.  The income poverty line shows a very sharp run-
up at ages 61 to 64.  The average retirement age in Canada is around age 61, but the GIS and 
OAS benefits do not begin until age 65.  The graph suggests that the lack of benefits in the 61-64 
age range is leading to substantial income poverty – reaching over one fifth of the population.  
However, the consumption poverty line shows almost no impact over the very same age range.  
This may indicate that the seniors are using savings or other channels of adjustment in order to 
smooth their consumption while awaiting the onset of their income security benefits at age 65. 
The next three rows display the results at different percentiles of the consumption 




th percentiles.  For the fully simulated benefits, both the 10
th and 50
th 
percentile results are significant at the 10 percent level, showing an effect of benefits of 0.383 
and 0.275 respectively.  The 90t percentile result is not statistically significant. 
The final two rows of Table 3 examine the effect of benefits on measures of happiness.  
For the very happy question, we see no sign of a statistically significant relationship between 
benefits and being very happy.  On the other hand, there is some evidence of a decrease in 
reports of being unhappy or very unhappy with higher benefits in the reduced form results, but 
not in the IV results. These weak results may be due to the lack of variation in the data we have 
for happiness – the data is much more limited than the consumption and income data.  
Conclusion 
 
We find strong evidence that Canada’s income security programs have improved the 
welfare of the cohorts in our data.  Our estimates suggest that these cohorts have more income  
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and consumption than they would in the absence of income security.  For poverty, we find large 
decreases in relative income poverty, suggesting that the expansions of income security 
programs in the 1970s had a substantial impact on poverty.  However, we do not find evidence 
that consumption poverty changed, suggesting that in the absence of benefits, poor families may 
have found some way to consume at adequate levels.  Finally, we find inconclusive evidence on 
measures of happiness. 
As a caveat, extrapolating these results beyond the observed cohorts must be done with 
care.  Policy changes may affect savings and consumption behaviour of generations that had 
more time to alter their plans than for cohorts who were surprised by policy changes in their 
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Figure 1: Real Maximum CPP, OAS and GIS Benefits 1961-2002 
Notes: GIS benefits are for a single individual. The CPP phase-in calculation is for December of 




























































































































































Average benefits / average worker income
 































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
year
Fully simulated benefit Partially simulated benefit
  
33 
























1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
year reached age 65
Fully simulated benefit Partially simulated benefit
 




























1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
year
Benefits at 60 Benefits at 65
Benefits at 70 Benefits at 80
Benefits at 90 
34 
























1970 1980 1990 2000
refyr − 1996
Index value 100 is equal to
2,083 for elderly
(2002 constant  )
 
























1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
elderly young
Index value 100 is equal to
10,520 for young and
10,420 for elderly
(2002 constant  ) 
35 























1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
elderly young
Index value 100 is equal to
0.100 for young and
0.122 for elderly.
 




















1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
elderly young
Index value 100 is equal to

























1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
elderly 10th percentile elderly 50th percentile
elderly 90th percentile young 50th percentile
Index value 100 is equal to
9,376 for 50th young,
3,287 for 10th elderly,
8,564 for 50th elderly and
19,302 for 90th elderly.
 



























1970 1980 1990 2000
year
elderly young
Index value 100 is equal to
11,637 for young and
11,749 for elderly
(2002 constant  ) 
37 























1970 1980 1990 2000
year
elderly young
Index value 100 is equal to
0.023 for young and
0.023 for elderly.
 





















1970 1980 1990 2000
year
elderly young
Index value 100 is equal to































1970 1980 1990 2000
year
elderly 10th percentile elderly 50th percentile
elderly 90th percentile young 50th percentile
Index value 100 is equal to
10,237 for 50th young,
5,543 for 10th elderly,
9,867 for 50th elderly and
19,847 for 90th elderly.
 























1985 1990 1995 2000
year
elderly young
Index value 100 is equal to
0.5097 for young and
0.4729 for elderly. 
39 






















1985 1990 1995 2000
year
elderly young
Index value 100 is equal to
0.0351 for young and
0.0624 for elderly.
 



































0 2000 4000 6000 8000
Fully simulated benefits
Income, age 55−59 Income, age 60−64






























































20 40 60 80
Age





Table  1: Data Description 
Years   Ages   Elderly
Measure Data Source Available Availab Sample Variable Description
Mean IS Income SCF/SLID 1971-2002 25-79 301,538    Mean family IS income
Mean IS income SCF/SLID 1971-2002 25-79 301,538    Mean IS income among
below poverty line families below poverty line
IS income of 5th-15th SCF/SLID 1971-2002 25-79 301,538    Mean IS income for families
percentile earners between 5th and 15th percentile
IS income of 45th-55th SCF/SLID 1971-2002 25-79 301,538    Mean IS income for families
percentile earners between 45th and 55th percentile
IS income of 85th-95th SCF/SLID 1971-2002 25-79 301,538    Mean IS income for families
percentile earners between 85th and 95th percentile
Mean after-tax income SCF/SLID 1971-2002 25-79 301,538    Mean total family income
after tax
Relative income poverty SCF/SLID 1971-2002 25-79 301,538    Equals one if under 40% of
working family median income
Absolute income poverty SCF/SLID 1971-2002 25-79 301,538    Equals one if under 40% of 1971
working family median income
10th percentile income SCF/SLID 1971-2002 25-79 301,538    10th percentile of total after-tax
family income
50th percentile income SCF/SLID 1971-2002 25-79 301,538    50th percentile of total after-tax
family income
90th percentile income SCF/SLID 1971-2002 25-79 301,538    90th percentile of total after-tax
family income
Mean consumption FAMEX/SHS 1969-2001 25-79 22,840      Mean of total family expenditure
Relative consumption FAMEX/SHS 1969-2001 25-79 22,840      Equals one if under 40% of 
poverty working family median consumption
Absolute consumption FAMEX/SHS 1969-2001 25-79 22,840      Equals one if under 40% of 1969
poverty working family median consumption
10th percentile FAMEX/SHS 1969-2001 25-79 22,840      10th percentile of total family
consumption consumption
50th percentile FAMEX/SHS 1969-2001 25-79 22,840      50th percentile of total family
consumption consumption
90th percentile FAMEX/SHS 1969-2001 25-79 22,840      90th percentile of total family
consumption consumption
Very happy GSS 1985-1998 25-74 39,247      Equals one if responded very
happy
Unhappy or very unhappy GSS 1985-1998 25-74 39,247      Equals one if responded unhappy
or very unhappy
Notes:  SCF is Survey of Consumer Finances.  SLID is Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics.  FAMEX is 
Survey of Family Expenditures.  SHS is survey of Household Spending.  GSS is General Social Survey. 
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Table 2:  Income regression results 
First Stage Reduced Form IV
Mean Obs. Partial Full Partial Full Partial Full
Mean IS income 5135 500 0.759 0.830
(0.048) (0.041)
Mean IS income,  1926 500 -0.213 -0.305
below poverty line (0.162) (0.182)
IS income of 5th-15th 2817 500 0.721 0.995
percentile earners (0.140) (0.164)
IS income of 45th-55th 5028 500 1.085 1.254
percentile earners (0.118) (0.115)
IS income of 85th-95th 7627 500 0.401 0.264
percentile earners (0.041) (0.043)
Mean income 14313 500 0.415 0.890 0.546 1.073
(0.141) (0.159) (0.183) (0.198)
Relative income 0.054 500 -0.020 -0.026 -0.027 -0.026
poverty (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Absolute income 0.028 500 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005
poverty (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
10th percentile 6903 500 0.682 0.934 0.945 0.938
income (0.134) (0.164) (0.106) (0.083)
50th percentile 12070 500 0.404 0.946 0.330 0.728
income (0.138) (0.151) (0.110) (0.133)
90th percentile 24130 500 0.352 0.660 0.878 2.502
income (0.233) (0.230) (0.608) (1.048)
Notes: Coefficients reported are for the variables listed on the left.  Details on the specifications
 are in the text. 
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Table 3:  Consumption and Happiness Results 
 
Reduced Form IV
Mean Obs. Partial Full Partial Full
Mean consumption 13799 226 0.406 0.502 0.660 0.797
(0.188) (0.191) (0.333) (0.329)
Relative consumption poverty 0.029 226 -0.004 -0.005 -0.008 -0.009
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.007)
Absolute consumption poverty 0.007 226 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
10th percentile consumption 6963 226 0.180 0.218 0.385 0.383
(0.090) (0.099) (0.246) (0.217)
50th percentile consumption 11852 226 0.170 0.311 0.150 0.275
(0.172) (0.180) (0.155) (0.162)
90th percentile consumption 23030 226 0.542 0.689 1.177 2.484
(0.595) (0.596) (1.343) (2.379)
Very happy 0.610 28 0.023 0.008 0.122 0.026
(0.037) (0.049) (0.206) (0.161)
Unhappy or very unhappy 0.057 28 -0.017 -0.022 -0.088 -0.073
(0.008) (0.011) (0.064) (0.054)
Notes: Coefficients reported are for the variables listed on the left.  Details on 
 the specifications are in the text.  
 
 